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Social norm nudging and preferences for household recycling 1 
 2 
Mikołaj Czajkowski1, Katarzyna Zagórska2 and Nick Hanley3 3 
 4 
Abstract: Previous research on pro-environmental behaviours has shown that nudges can be 5 
effective in changing behaviour in some settings. However, to be a useful policy tool, nudges 6 
should have stable, predictable impacts on targeted behaviours. In this paper, we use a 7 
randomized experiment to test one specific nudge, namely the communication of a descriptive 8 
social norm. The paper examines whether the effects of such a nudge on stated preferences 9 
for household recycling are indeed stable and predictable in terms of household willingness to 10 
pay for waste collection contracts requiring more recycling effort by households. Three aspects 11 
of the social norm are varied: its absolute level, the geographic proximity, and whether relative 12 
performance information is included. We find that while respondents generally respond 13 
positively to social norm information, the effect is not necessarily monotonic, with the highest 14 
social norm levels not necessarily being the most effective, in fact discouraging some 15 
respondents from sorting. In addition, whether and how respondents react to the social norm 16 
information strongly depends on their current engagement level, with respondents who sort a 17 
lot reacting in a negative manner.  18 
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Highlights: 1 
- Preferences for household recycling in Poland are examined; 2 
- The effect of communicated social norm is varied in terms of absolute level, 3 
geographical proximity, and relative comparison provided; 4 
- Stated willingness to pay for more recycling varies with the level and type of the 5 
norm;  6 
- Effects are highly dependent on an individual’s current recycling effort. 7 
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3 
1. Introduction 1 
Increased household recycling levels is an objective for many governments. Higher levels of 2 
household recycling can contribute to reductions in water pollution (including plastics pollution 3 
to the sea), to climate change policy, or to reducing material use and solid waste flows to 4 
landfill sites (Davies and Doble, 2004; Kinnaman, 2006; Cleary, 2009; Acuff and Kaffine, 2013). 5 
From a systems viewpoint, household-level sorting is often seen as economically efficient, 6 
relative to central sorting. It is also more effective with respect to some waste categories, 7 
which once mixed with other waste are difficult or impossible to recycle (e.g., paper, plastics, 8 
and biodegradables). The policy design problem is therefore one of encouraging citizens to 9 
voluntarily contribute to this public good by increasing their level of household sorting.  10 
A large empirical literature in economics, dating back to the mid-1990s (Hong, Adams and Love, 11 
1993), shows that peoples’ recycling and waste disposal behaviours respond both to price 12 
incentives (“pay as you throw”) for conventional waste disposal, and to changes in waste 13 
collection system which impact on the costs of effort to recycle (such as the requirement for 14 
households to source-separate wastes; or the deployment of kerb-side recycling pickups; 15 
Viscusi, Huber and Bell, 2011). Moreover, researchers including Bartelings and Sterner (1999) 16 
and Hage, Söderholm and Berglund (2009) have identified the importance of what the former 17 
refer to as “non-economic motives” for recycling behaviours: beliefs, ethical positions and a 18 
regard for the behaviour or opinion of others (Viscusi, Huber and Bell, 2011).  19 
Indeed, a wide literature within behavioural economics tells us that economic agents respond 20 
to many more influences than just changes in relative prices and income (Chetty, 2015; Nyborg 21 
et al., 2016). For environmental public goods in particular, Croson and Treich (2014) argue that 22 
“…socio-psychological factors play an important role...” in behaviour (p. 336), and note that 23 
changes to the framing of decisions might be particularly important. One aspect of the framing 24 
of choices is what people understand or believe about the behaviour of others, that is, about 25 
a social norm. Changing the framing of people’s choices over environmental goods through a 26 
policy initiative is known as a “nudge” (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). Providing information on a 27 
social norm is a specific type of nudge. For nudges to be a useful part of the environmental 28 
policy toolkit, they need to be effective in changing behaviour, and to have reliable, predictable 29 
impacts. However, empirical evidence on the effectiveness of social norm nudges in changing 30 
pro-environmental behaviours is currently divided (see for example Richter, Thøgersen and 31 
4 
Klöckner, 2018, and the literature review in Section 2 for a discussion). Understanding of what 1 
determines the effect of a social norm nudge, and how sensitive the nudge is to changes in the 2 
choice context, is thus important for recycling policy design.  3 
To address this problem, we designed and conducted a stated preference (SP) study, in which 4 
we experimentally manipulated communicated social norms (information about recycling 5 
efforts of others). We use stated willingness to pay for higher levels of recycling required by a 6 
waste collection contract as an indicator of future levels of recycling by the household. SP 7 
methods have been widely used in policy analysis with respect to a range of pro-environmental 8 
behaviours (Hanley and Czajkowski, forthcoming). SP approaches allow the preferences of the 9 
wider public to be considered in policy making in a cost-effective manner. SP studies are 10 
cheaper and easier to implement than Randomized Control Trials as a tool for predicting policy 11 
outcomes, whilst incentivised lab experiments typically draw on non-representative (e.g., 12 
student) subjects, which is an important drawback if we are trying to estimate the preferences 13 
of those who will be affected by a policy initiative. Finally, an SP approach allows for 14 
preferences to be estimated for policy options which are currently not in existence in the case 15 
study area, an important advantage over revealed preference approaches. 16 
A potential disadvantage of SP is that the approach is based on responses in hypothetical 17 
markets rather than on actual behaviour, as so could result in “hypothetical bias”. However, 18 
given the substantial progress in understanding what constitutes best practice in SP design, 19 
well-deigned studies can be a reliable and informative source of estimates of people’s 20 
preferences for environmental improvements, and their willingness to undertake pro-21 
environmental actions (Carson and Groves, 2007; Vossler, Doyon and Rondeau, 2012; Johnston 22 
et al., 2017). 23 
This paper contributes to the literature on nudges and pro-environmental behaviours by 24 
investigating how stated willingness to pay (WTP) for higher levels of recycling within a 25 
household depends on the nature of the nudge provided. In particular, an experimental design 26 
is used which allows us to vary the absolute size of the social norm and its geographic proximity. 27 
We also investigate whether adding relative performance information increase the effect of 28 
the nudge; and whether these effects depend on the current and prior behaviours of the 29 
individual. These issues are important if governments wish to employ social norm-based 30 
5 
nudges alongside prices and infrastructural improvements to help achieve recycling goals (or, 1 
indeed, any environmental policy goal).  2 
In what follows, we first of all briefly summarise the literature on the effects of social norms 3 
and social norm-bssed nudges on pro-environmental behaviours. Section 3 then discusses 4 
evidence on how such norm-based approach fits in with other likely determinants of household 5 
recycling behaviour. This leads to a set of testable hypotheses which inform a research design 6 
set out in section 4. Section 5 has results, and section 6 discussion and conclusions. 7 
 8 
2. Social norms and pro-environmental behaviours 9 
A social norm can comprise a typical behaviour of one’s important reference group in a 10 
particular decision context (this is also known as a descriptive norm). For example, how many 11 
people in my village take empty glass bottles to the bottle bank? What is the average electricity 12 
consumption per month in my apartment block? Such descriptive social norms represent the 13 
behaviour of the majority, and can be expressed in terms of how common the behaviour is and 14 
what is the mean level of engagement in the behaviour (for discussion on the use of social 15 
norm concept in economics see Nyborg (2018) and Wallen and Romulo (2017)). Descriptive 16 
social norms can be distinguished from injunctive social norms that represent views on what 17 
one ought to do (Cialdini, Reno and Kallgren, 1990). Injunctive norms are related to commonly-18 
held opinions in society on actions that merit social approval or disapproval. Farrow, Grolleau 19 
and Ibanez (2017) synthetize taxonomies of different types of norms, and how they interrelate 20 
with one another. In our study, social norms are communicated as prevalence of recycling 21 
behaviours within different interest groups, and are thus descriptive norms.  22 
Research on the effectiveness of social norms in regulating human behaviour began in social 23 
psychology long before it was first applied in behavioural economics (Cialdini, Reno and 24 
Kallgren, 1990; Schultz, 1999). It is now a well-documented phenomena that people in some 25 
situations imitate the behaviours of others and try to conform to this majority behaviour (Asch, 26 
1956; for a review see Cialdini and Goldstein, 2004). Direct experience of the actions of other 27 
people influences one’s own behaviour (Nolan et al., 2008) leading to social norms become 28 
unconsciously internalised (Sherif, 1936). In economics, interventions based on social norms 29 
6 
have proved to be effective in changing individuals’ choices in laboratory studies and field 1 
experiments (Schultz et al., 2007; Sliwka, 2007; Shang and Croson, 2009).  2 
There is now a large body of evidence on the role and influence of social norm nudges on a 3 
wide range of environmentally-related choices and behaviours (Farrow, Grolleau and Ibanez, 4 
2017). Much of this research has shown an effect when descriptive social norms were 5 
communicated to subjects in a written message instead of being directly observed by them 6 
(e.g., Schultz, 1999; Nolan et al., 2008). The best-known examples in the environmental area 7 
include large-scale applied microeconomic experiments, some based on hundreds of 8 
thousands of observations, which show that individuals informed or reminded about the 9 
behaviour of relevant others may reduce energy consumption (Schultz et al., 2007; Nolan et 10 
al., 2008; Allcott, 2011; Ayres, Raseman and Shih, 2013) or save water (Ferraro, Miranda and 11 
Price, 2011; Ferraro and Price, 2013). Allcott (2011) showed that information allowing for a 12 
comparison of one’s own electricity use to the average level of neighbours reduced 13 
consumption by 2% relative to a control group. People with electricity use much higher than 14 
the average cut consumption by the greatest fraction, whilst those with lower-than-average 15 
consumption did not increase electricity use (i.e., a boomerang effects was avoided). 16 
Treatment effect did not fade with time (Allcott and Rogers, 2014), much of which was later 17 
attributed to investments in physical capital, i.e. acquisition of energy-efficient appliances 18 
(Brandon et al., 2017). Ferraro and Price (2013) evaluate the effects of social comparison 19 
information on demand for water by residential customers in the USA. They found that such 20 
information had a bigger effect on consumption than simply asking people to reduce water use 21 
or telling them how to do so; and that the effects of social comparison information was 22 
greatest for those consumers who had relatively high water use. Another well-known example 23 
showed increase in towel reuse in hotel rooms, when people were informed about how many 24 
guests re-use their towels (Nolan et al., 2008).   25 
However, social norms communication is not a universally effective environmental policy tool. 26 
Recently, the Alcott experiment on the role of social comparisons in energy reduction was 27 
replicated in Germany (where energy consumption is much lower than in the USA). A much 28 
smaller effect of the norm was found (Andor et al., 2017). Non-effectiveness of social nom 29 
nudges was found in studies on sustainable seafood purchasing patterns (Richter, Thøgersen 30 
and Klöckner, 2018) and fees collection amongst students (Silva and John, 2017). Attempted 31 
7 
replications of the Nolan et al towel reuse programs could not reproduce the original results 1 
(Nolan et al., 2008; Schultz, Khazian and Zaleski, 2008; Bohner and Schlüter, 2014; Reese, Loew 2 
and Steffgen, 2014).  This points to contextual and social dynamic effects in a population in 3 
terms of how people respond to social norm information (Nyborg et al., 2016). Schultz (2014) 4 
notes that communicated social norms effectively promote pro-environmental behaviour but 5 
only “in some contexts, for some behaviours, and for some individuals”. One should therefore 6 
expect a high degree of inter-personal heterogeneity in how a specific nudge affects choices in 7 
different contexts, and also differences between countries and cultures. 8 
According to the classic theory of normative conduct, the effectiveness of descriptive and 9 
injunctive norms depends on their saliency (Cialdini, Reno and Kallgren, 1990; Cialdini, Kallgren 10 
and Reno, 1991). The impact of social norms is determined by the degree to which the norm 11 
is in focus (Kallgren, Reno and Cialdini, 2000) and to which norms are consistent (Cialdini, 2003). 12 
Previous research has shown a great power of descriptive social norms in changing behaviours 13 
(e.g., Lewis and Neighbors, 2006), but communication of injunctive norms is more effective 14 
when socially undesirable behaviours are common and widespread (Cialdini et al., 2006; 15 
Cialdini, 2009).  16 
A separate strand of research focuses on aspects related to identification with the reference 17 
group. Nolan et al. (2008) show that a more local norm, for guest of same room, is more 18 
influential than norm for guest of the hotel. A local social norm on tax payments was also more 19 
effective than the country level norm in increasing tax compliance (Hallsworth et al., 2017). 20 
Heterogeneity of identities within the reference groups may led to emergence of anti-21 
conformist bias (Silva and John, 2017). In summary, the impact of social norms on behaviour 22 
may depend on factors such as an individual’s self-identification with social peer group (e.g., 23 
“other rock climbers think it is important not to litter”), the implied reference group, the norm 24 
evoked and the specific environmental context (Farrow, Grolleau and Ibanez, 2017). 25 
Broadly speaking, the motivating effect of the descriptive social norm nudge comes from 26 
comparison of one’s own behaviour to the expected conduct signalled by the communicated 27 
norm and one’s subsequent willingness to conform. The difference between an individual's 28 
own behaviour and the behaviour of others can enter into her utility pay-offs through different 29 
channels of motivation such as a concern for self-image, an external-image concern 30 
(Czajkowski, Hanley and Nyborg, 2015) and concern for others (for a review on conformity see 31 
8 
Cialdini and Goldstein, 2004). However, the exact mechanisms underlying observed changes in 1 
choices after social norm interventions, especially why of the behaviours change, are not yet 2 
well understood (Brandon et al., 2017), and nudge based interventions lack rigorous economic 3 
theoretical support (Ölander and Thøgersen, 2014). In particular, economic theories do not 4 
account well for the diversity of real-world behaviours related to social norms, and cognitive 5 
processes related to changing perceptions of a communicated norm. 6 
According to Thaler and Sunstein (2008) social norms are part of people’s choice architecture 7 
and their communication has a persuasive “nudging” impact (Ölander and Thøgersen, 2014; 8 
Richter, Thøgersen and Klöckner, 2018). Social norm interventions were shown to work 9 
through intuitive, heuristic reasoning processes, unrecognized by subjects (Cialdini, 2007; 10 
Nolan et al., 2008). From a psychological perspective, social influence-related behaviours often 11 
serve multiple goals, the most important being accuracy, affiliation, and the maintenance of a 12 
positive self-concept; whilst social influence processes are “subtle, indirect, heuristic-based, 13 
and outside of awareness” (Cialdini and Goldstein, 2004). 14 
In empirical work studying the influence of social norms on pro-environmental behaviours such 15 
as recycling, three main approaches are taken. The first approach is observational, using 16 
revealed preference methods to see how choices shift when individuals move between 17 
surroundings and the associated reference group norms. The second approach is to ask people 18 
what they think the social norm is, or about other aspects related to social norms, such as  19 
concerns with respect to others’ perceptions of one’s behaviour (Armstrong et al., 2017) or 20 
views on the behaviour of their neighbours (Viscusi, Huber and Bell, 2011). The third approach 21 
is experimental, which manipulates social norms in contextual “cues” or communicates social 22 
norms in direct messages expressing a new reference point. This can take a flexible form such 23 
as feedback on the level of action taken by others (ex. neighbours), information about the 24 
number of people who take an action, about actions undertaken or approved by other people 25 
in a particular reference group.  26 
 27 
3. Determinants of household recycling behaviour 28 
Understanding the likely effects of using a social norm to change recycling behaviour requires 29 
an appreciation of what other factors determine a household’s recycling behaviour. In 30 
9 
conjunction with the information on the determinants of nudge effects outlined in the previous 1 
section, this allows the development of four testable hypotheses concerning the likely impact 2 
of different forms of communicated social norm in the present study. 3 
Recycling decisions by a household depend on a combination of economic, moral (internal) 4 
and social (external) factors (Viscusi, Huber and Bell, 2011). Economic factors include the time 5 
cost of sorting wastes and any utility gained from the act of home sorting. Moral factors include 6 
ethical views on waste and personal responsibility. Social factors include pressure from our 7 
neighbours and our views on what others more widely expect us to do, or our impressions of 8 
what others do. The strength of and balance between these three sets of factors determine 9 
how much each individual wishes to recycle, and their willingness to engage in and pay for 10 
recycling and waste collection services (Armstrong et al., 2017). 11 
Recycling is a form of pro-environmental behaviour. It is individually costly, requiring the 12 
allocation of time, space, and effort (Bruvoll, Halvorsen and Nyborg, 2002) and results in 13 
provision of a public environmental good (Abbott, Nandeibam and O'Shea, 2013). Nevertheless, 14 
when given the opportunity to recycle, some individuals engage in it without any monetary 15 
motivation (Berglund, 2006; Briguglio, Delaney and Wood, 2016). This behaviour may reflect a 16 
range of private benefits associated with increased home recycling, such as a personal sense 17 
of satisfaction, or a belief that individuals are better at waste separation than central recycling 18 
facilities. A positive WTP for home sorting of wastes was found for a sample of Polish 19 
households by Czajkowski, Kądziela and Hanley (2014) despite no change in the level of 20 
recycling achieved in their municipality; whilst in a follow-up study, Armstrong et al. (2017) 21 
show that this positive WTP for a substantial group of respondents was motivated by belief in 22 
a social norm, namely their perception that their neighbours would judge them badly for not 23 
engaging in recycling efforts. 24 
Using aggregate rather than individual data, Abbott, Nandeibam and O'Shea (2013) investigate 25 
the determinants of per capita recycling using data from English local authorities. They find 26 
that it is partly explained by a social norm, which they construct as the mean level of recycling 27 
in a reference group of local authorities (although it is not clear that individuals would be aware 28 
of this level: a problem we avoid in our study). Sidique, Lupi and Joshi (2010) show that a 29 
perception that family and neighbours expect one to sort is a significant driver of recycling in 30 
Michigan. Brekke, Kipperberg and Nyborg (2010) find empirical evidence from Norwegian 31 
10 
households which supports a model of recycling where individuals are motivated by 1 
considering the gap between the recycling actions of others and their own behaviour. Hage, 2 
Söderholm and Berglund (2009) use survey data of 2,800 Swedish households focussing on 3 
their self-reported levels of recycling for packaging waste. They find that self-reported 4 
recycling behaviour increases with perception of other’s recycling behaviours (“how much of 5 
their household waste do you think that other households in your municipality recycle?”) and 6 
a feeling of moral obligation, but does not change with a social norm (“important persons close 7 
to me want me to recycle”). Miliute-Plepiene et al. (2016) found that in early-stage recycling 8 
schemes (Lithuania) social norms (perceived behaviour of important persons) are important. 9 
Poland can be considered such an early-stage recycling scheme. Note, however, that the 10 
authors of abovementioned studies do not externally vary the strength of the social norm, 11 
relying instead on variation in people’s agreement with statements describing the behaviour 12 
or attitudes of others. A study using communicated norms was conducted by Schultz (1999), 13 
who showed that a group feedback intervention (a descriptive norm) increased participation 14 
in a recycling programme. In contrast, the field experiment of van Soest and Vollaard (2018) 15 
shows no effect of descriptive or injunctive social norm treatments on recycling behaviours in 16 
the Netherlands.  17 
 18 
Based on the literature reviewed above, we developed four testable hypotheses concerning 19 
the effects of a social norm-based nudge on household preferences for recycling. These then 20 
informed the design of an empirical strategy described below. Our hypotheses are tested using 21 
a study implemented in Poland (described in more detail in the following section), where the 22 
characteristics of household waste systems make construction of credible stated preference 23 
scenarios possible.  24 
The hypotheses to be tested are as follows: 25 
Size of the norm  26 
In Armstrong et al. (2017), one relevant factor determining how much an individual wishes to 27 
recycle is the difference between their current behaviour and that of a relevant interest group, 28 
weighted by a utility parameter. This implies that the effect of providing a nudge should 29 
depend on the absolute size of the social norm, since for any individual this determines the 30 
11 
distance between their current behaviour and that norm. This takes into account both 1 
individuals with a relevant behaviour above the social norm (I recycle more than others in my 2 
town) and below this norm (I recycle less). However, there is no empirical evidence to date on 3 
this “absolute norm” effect for household recycling. We thus test: 4 
H1: Higher levels of the absolute size of the social norm (communicated shares of others 5 
who recycle) lead to increased willingness to pay for contracts with more household-level 6 
sorting.  7 
  8 
Geographic proximity 9 
There is some evidence in the literature of a “geographic proximity” effect for social norms. 10 
Based on Bohner and Schlüter (2014), and Hallsworth et al 2017, we expect the nudge 11 
associated with a social norm of given absolute size to be stronger when the norm relates to 12 
behaviour in a community “closer” to the individual in some sense. Here, we test for the effect 13 
by comparing a norm based on recycling rates in the city where the respondent lives compared 14 
to the nation as a whole. A geographic proximity effect is also likely if one considers the sub-15 
set of people conforming to a given behaviour who are likely to sanction me for breaking the 16 
norm: this subset is more likely to be composed of those living close to me than those living 17 
further away, even if the latter are members of a relevant peer group (Masclet et al., 2003). 18 
This leads to the second hypothesis to be tested: 19 
H2: A descriptive social norm of give absolute size will have a larger nudge effect when it 20 
relates to the behaviour of a geographically-closer community than a geographically more 21 
distant community. 22 
Relative versus absolute norms 23 
The nudge effect of a social norm depends on people comparing their behaviour to that of 24 
“relevant others”, or caring about the behaviour/opinion of relevant others. However, it may 25 
be hard for people to judge their performance compared to others when only presented with 26 
an absolute value. We thus wish to see whether providing additional information on relative 27 
performance increases the strength of the nudge. This leads to hypothesis 3: 28 
12 
H3: The nudge effect will be stronger when information on relative performance is provided 1 
alongside absolute performance data. 2 
Effects of past behaviour 3 
Finally, it is clear from work such as Ferrero and Price (2013),  Viscusi, Huber and Bell (2011) 4 
and Brekke, Kipperberg and Nyborg (2010) that the effects of social norm information are 5 
mitigated by preference parameters within people’s utility function (how much weight I place 6 
on my own moral views; how much weight I place on the views of others…), the prices they 7 
face in engaging in recycling activity, and their past experience or behaviours. Both prior to the 8 
nudge being implemented and once it is in place, these preferences and prices co-determine 9 
our behaviour. This implies that the effects of a specific nudge will be mediated by people’s 10 
preferences and the prices they face, which in turn are reflected in their past recycling 11 
behaviours. Logically then, the effectiveness of a nudge should vary across people with 12 
different histories of recycling behaviour. This leads to a final testable hypothesis: 13 
H4: The effective of a descriptive social norm on willingness to pay for future recycling 14 
actions will depend on an individual’s past record of recycling. 15 
 16 
4. Study design: recycling by Polish households 17 
In this paper, a stated preference approach (Hanley and Czajkowski, 2017) was taken to 18 
estimate the effects of a nudge on WTP for higher levels of household recycling. A choice 19 
experiment based on the design earlier used by Czajkowski, Kądziela and Hanley (2014) and 20 
Armstrong et al. (2017) was employed. Polish households were the population of interest. The 21 
questionnaire consisted of five main sections: (1) an introduction, (2) questions on current 22 
method of household waste collection, and individual opinions on waste management policy, 23 
(3) description of Polish recycling regulations and attributes in the choice scenarios, (4) the 24 
choice sets measuring preferences for alternative waste collection schemes, (5) elicitation of 25 
attitudes to recycling and socio-demographic questions.  26 
At the beginning of the survey, subjects were informed about outcome consequentiality of the 27 
survey – that the results would be communicated to policy makers and could be used for 28 
designing changes to municipal solid waste management policy which were being considered 29 
13 
at the time. The study was conducted during discussions regarding the revision of waste sorting 1 
and recycling policies in Poland that had been introduced a few years earlier. In this policy 2 
innovation, municipalities were required to meet recycling targets while designing and 3 
organizing a system of waste recycling and collection for all inhabitants of the municipality. 4 
Each municipality could choose different waste sorting and collection systems, characterised 5 
by  the number of categories households are required to sort their waste to, and ex-post 6 
sorting in central facilities. Fees charged per household depended on the nature of the scheme 7 
offered and household size.  8 
In practice, a campaign communicating social norms can be used to maximize support for a 9 
policy involving more sorting at household level, or establishing a stronger norm of rigorous 10 
sorting amongst households who decided to have different waste categories collected 11 
separately. Since EU recycling targets were established and are enforced at the level of the 12 
municipality, we were able to hold the overall level of recycling (the supply of the public good) 13 
constant across all choice scenarios, since central waste sorting would be required to make 14 
sure the municipality target was achieved if households choose to not recycle (ie sort) enough. 15 
The survey participants were informed about this requirement for sufficient central facility 16 
sorting to satisfy the overall recycling targets.  17 
The choice experiment (Carson and Czajkowski, 2014) consisted of 12 choice tasks that asked 18 
respondents which waste collection contract they preferred from a range of possibilities. 19 
Possible contracts were described in terms of the following attributes: 20 
‒ SORT − this attribute described into how many categories a household would be 21 
required to sort waste into before it was collected. The levels of this attribute (the 22 
number of sorting categories) consisted of no sorting by the household, or sorting into 23 
2, 3, or 5 categories of waste. This attribute represents our main measure of household 24 
recycling behaviour. 25 
‒ TIME − the frequency of waste collection. The levels ranged from daily collection, 26 
through collection thrice, twice, once a week, to once every two weeks. This attribute 27 
in included as our earlier work (cited above) showed the frequency of waste collection 28 
to be important for some households in terms of which waste management contract 29 
they would prefer. 30 
14 
‒ PRICE − a monthly bill sent to respondent’s household, which amounted to 25, 50, 75, 1 
and 100 PLN4.  2 
In each choice situation, one of the alternatives represented the current method of household 3 
waste collection and recycling (the status quo). An example choice card is provided in Figure 1. 4 
In each choice situation, respondents were asked to choose their most preferred contract out 5 
of a set of four available options.  6 
 7 
Figure 1. Example of a choice card (translation) 8 
Situation 1. 
 
Option 1  Option 2  Option 3  
Current method of 
waste collection 
Method of sorting in 
household 
 Sorting into 3 
categories  
Sorting into 2 
categories  
Sorting into 5 
categories  
Frequency of waste 
collection 
 
Once a week  Three times a week  Twice a week  
Monthly cost for your 
household 
 
25 PLN  100 PLN  50 PLN  
Your choice: 
 
□  □  □  □ 
 9 
4.1. Information treatments for the social norm 10 
In the survey, we provided respondents with a descriptive social norm, defined in terms of 11 
what respondents are told about the level of recycling in their community, where “community” 12 
can mean either country (Poland) or their city of residence, depending on the treatment to 13 
which a particular participant is allocated. We avoided the unethical procedure of providing 14 
false information to subjects (that is, we avoided deception). Instead, we used factual 15 
information from a number of different reliable reports and official data sources (Central 16 
Statistical Office of Poland, Ministry of Environment website, Polish Press Agency, Public 17 
Opinion Research Centre) on different aspects of recycling and waste management at national 18 
and city levels. We used the most recent data available at the time when the study was 19 
designed and conducted. Even though the reference year differs between treatments (2011 or 20 
                                                     
4 At the time of our study 1 PLN ≈ 0.25 EUR ≈ 0.33 USD. 
15 
2012), there were no major changes in the public opinion, political situation or Polish recycling 1 
system at the time. As a result, we expect that the year used in the intervention will not matter. 2 
This procedure allowed us to vary the figure given to each respondent across the treatments, 3 
whilst avoiding what Croson and Treich (2014) refer to as “deceptive nudges”.  4 
The figures provided for the descriptive social norm referred to either the % of households that 5 
reported sorting waste in a particular year, the % of household waste collected that is sorted, 6 
or the % of waste collected separately (that is, source-separated by households). These are not 7 
identical definitions of household recycling, but all refer to the same process of waste 8 
separation and collection in different years. That is, these alternative definitions of the level of 9 
recycling all refer to how common participation in recycling is. Whilst it is to be regretted that 10 
the way in which the social norm is described in each treatment varies somewhat, the only 11 
alternative experimental design was to deceive respondents. 12 
Treatment groups are set out below in Figure 2, and each respondent was randomly allocated 13 
to one of the eight treatments. Each respondent was only provided with one of piece of 14 
information on recycling behaviour by others, apart from those in control group (treatment #8 15 
below) who were not provided with any of this information. That is, each person surveyed 16 
received only one kind of social norm-based nudge, or else received no nudge. Treatments #1 17 
to #3 included three levels of a national norm: low, medium, and high.  This allows us to test 18 
hypothesis H1, where the relevant peer group is taken to be everyone living in Poland. 19 
Treatments #4, #5, #6 and #7 refer to differences in the size of norm presented in terms of the 20 
city where people live. Sampling was undertaken in 3 Polish cities (Cracow, Warsaw and 21 
Bialystok) to accomplish this. These cities were selected because they differed in the current 22 
recycling rates, offering a range of baseline situations. Comparing the effects of varying the 23 
size of the city-norm with the size of the country-norm allow us to test the geographic 24 
proximity effect, that is H2. Within these 4 city-group treatments, we also include variation 25 
according to whether people are told about how recycling levels in their city compare to the 26 
national figure for Poland. This allows a test of the relative versus absolute norm effect, H3, by 27 
comparing T4 with T5, and T6 with T7. Finally, we present below an analysis of how the effects 28 
of a given nudge vary according to peoples’ self-reported past recycling behaviours, to enable 29 
a test of H4. Comparing preferences or WTP with T8 with another other treatment allows for 30 
a test of the presence of any descriptive social norm effect at all. 31 
16 
Figure 2: Treatment groups 1 
‒ T1. “In 2011, 10% of all municipal waste collected from households in Poland was 2 
sorted.” 3 
‒ T2. “In 2012, 44% of households in Poland stated that they sort waste regularly.” 4 
‒ T3. “In 2012, 69% of households in Poland declared that they sort waste.” 5 
‒ T4. “In 2011, 15%/11%/6%* of all municipal waste collected from households in 6 
Cracow/Warsaw/Bialystok was collected selectively5.” 7 
‒ T5. “In 2011, 15%/11%/6%* of all municipal waste collected from households in 8 
Cracow/Warsaw/Bialystok was collected selectively. The average for Poland is 10%.” 9 
‒ T6. “In 2011, 72%/65%/58%* of households in Cracow/Warsaw/Bialystok declared that 10 
they sort waste.” 11 
‒ T7. “In 2011, 72%/65%/58%* of households in Cracow/Warsaw/Bialystok declared that 12 
they sort waste. The average for Poland is 69%.” 13 
‒ T8. No information on national or local levels of sorting of waste provided. 14 
 15 
4.2. Survey administration  16 
The survey questionnaire was administered via a computer-assisted web interviewing (CAWI) 17 
technique to a sample of households in Cracow, Warsaw and Bialystok during February 2014. 18 
The final sample consisted of 1,853 respondents, with approximately 600 respondents per city. 19 
The sample was quota-controlled with respect to gender, age and being a resident of the 20 
respective city. The data collection was contracted to a professional public opinion company.  21 
 22 
4.3. Econometric Approach 23 
The discrete choice data is modelled using random utility theory (McFadden, 1974). This 24 
assumes that the utility an individual receives from an alternative depends on observed 25 
characteristics (attributes) of both the choice alternatives and the individual making those 26 
choices; and unobserved idiosyncrasies represented by a stochastic component. Individual i ’s 27 
utility from choosing alternative j  in situation t  can be expressed as: 28 
 29 
                                                     
 
17 
 = +ijt ijt i ijtV eX β .  (1) 1 
 2 
This utility expression is separable in the observed choice attributes ijtX  and ijte  the stochastic 3 
component representing unobservable factors that affect individuals’ choices (or random 4 
aspects of choice). In the mixed logit model (MXL), the parameters iβ  represent individual-5 
specific taste parameters associated with marginal utilities of the choice attributes, allowing 6 
for heterogeneous preferences among the respondents. The multivariate (parametric) 7 
distribution of these parameters in the sample is ( )~ ,iβ f b Σ , where b  is a vector of sample 8 
means and Σ  is a variance-covariance matrix. A convenient way of accounting for preference 9 
differences associated with information treatments is ( )~ ,i iz+β f b δ Σ , where z  is a binary 10 
indicator for treatment effects and δ  is a vector of its estimated attribute-specific effects.  11 
To facilitate interpretation of the results we specify the model in WTP-space (Train and Weeks, 12 
2005; Bateman et al., 2008): 13 
 14 
 ( )β ε− −= + +m m m mij i ijt ijt i ijU X X β ,  (2) 15 
 16 
where mijX  is the monetary attribute with respect to which all marginal rates of substitution are 17 
expressed, and −mijX  are all other, non-monetary attributes. In this specification, parameter 18 
estimates ( )−miβ  can readily be interpreted as marginal WTP for the non-monetary attributes.  19 
Estimation of the MXL requires calculation of the k -dimensional integral for a likelihood 20 
function of individual i :  21 
 22 
 ( ) ( ) ( )β β β− − −= Ω∫ | , , , | ,m m m m m mi i ijt i i i i i iL p f dy X β β β ,  (3) 23 
 24 
18 
where ( )β − Ω, |m mi if β  is a density function of random parameters, which distributions depend 1 
on parameters to be estimated, Ω , and ( )β −| , ,m mi ijt i ip y X β  is conditional probability of making 2 
choices, iy , given by: 3 
 4 
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 6 
As the analytical formula for integral in (7) is usually not known it has to be approximated. 7 
Usually, researchers employ Maximum Simulated Likelihood (MSL) method, in which R  8 
random draws from distribution described by ( )β − Ω, |m mi if β  has to be generated for each 9 
individual, and then (7) can be approximated as: 10 
 11 




y X β ,  (5) 12 
 13 
where additional index r , denotes the r -th draw. To make the simulation sufficiently precise 14 
we used 10,000 scrambled Sobol draws (Czajkowski and Budziński, 2017).  15 
In the modelling, the cost variable was specified as continuous and other attributes were 16 
dummy-coded. The parameters of alternative specific constants (ASC) and all other attributes, 17 
including the cost were modelled as random and correlated. All parameters were assumed to 18 
follow normal distributions with the exception of cost, which was assumed to be negative log-19 
normally distributed.6  20 
 21 
                                                     
6 The models were estimated using a DCE package, which among other things can be used to estimate MXL 
models. The package has been developed in Matlab and is available at https://github.com/czaj/DCE. The code 
and data for estimating the specific models presented in this study are available from 
http://czaj.org/research/supplementary-materials. 
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5. Results 1 
Table 1 presents the choice modelling results. In the first column of data, we see parameter 2 
estimates on pooled data where we do not distinguish among treatments. Since the model is 3 
estimated in WTP-space, parameters for each attribute level are interpreted as WTP for a 4 
change in the attribute to this level relative to a baseline.  5 
The coefficient on the status quo is negative and significant, likely implying people’s dislike for 6 
the current recycling policy in Poland. For the sort attribute, relative to the baseline of no 7 
sorting being necessary at home, subjects have a positive WTP for sorting waste, which is 8 
lowest for sorting into 5 categories. This result that people value higher levels of home 9 
recycling (more sorting) is in line with Czajkowski, Kądziela and Hanley (2014) and Czajkowski, 10 
Hanley and Nyborg (2015). Regarding collection frequency, people are willing to pay extra to 11 
increase it above twice per month, with the highest mean WTP for collection 3 times per week. 12 
For all attributes and all levels, a significant preference heterogeneity is observed, as indicated 13 
by the standard deviation parameter estimates in column 2. 14 
20 
Table 1. The results of the MXL model in WTP-space (EUR) representing consumers’ general preferences for the number of in-home sorting categories 
and the frequency of collection in future waste collection contracts 
 Mean St. Dev. 
Status quo (ASC) -9.85*** (0.10) 
9.41*** 
(0.17) 
Sort in 2 categories  





Sort in 3 categories  





Sort in 5 categories  





Collect 1 time per week  





Collect 2 times per week 





Collect 3 times per week 





Collect 7 times per week 





- Monthly cost per household -0.41*** (0.05) 
1.30*** 
(0.05) 
Model diagnostics   
LL at convergence -16,043.92  
LL at constant(s) only -28,054.48  
McFadden's pseudo-R² 0.4281  
Ben-Akiva-Lerman's pseudo-R² 0.5196  
AIC/n 1.4479  
BIC/n 1.4674  
n (observations) 22,236  
r (respondents) 1,853  
k (parameters) 54  
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. Parameter estimates represent WTP expressed in EUR per month per household. Standard errors 
provided in parentheses. All parameters were assumed to be normally distributed with the exception of the cost, which was assumed log-normally distributed (estimated coefficients 
of the underlying normal distribution provided). The model controls for scale (variance of the error term of utility function) differences between treatments. The scale parameters 
were skipped for brevity – full results are available in the online supplement to this paper.  
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5.1. Hypothesis tests 1 
H1: Absolute size of the social norm 2 
In section 3, we hypothesized that the effect of a descriptive norm on pro-environmental 3 
behaviours would depend on the absolute size of this norm (eg % of people who recycle in 4 
Poland) since, in the theoretical model provided in Czajkowski et al (2017), the utility penalty 5 
from deviating from average group behaviour is higher the bigger is the gap between what an 6 
individual currently does and this group average. Table 2 presents the results of three models 7 
in which the effects of T2 and T3 are evaluated relative to T1, the effects of T6 are relative to 8 
T4, and the effects of T7 are relative to T5. These comparisons all allow an evaluation of the 9 
effects of changing the absolute size of the descriptive social norm. Looking first at national 10 
level norm information, and thus comparing T1, T2 and T3, we see that there is a significant 11 
rise in the size of WTP for sorting into 2, 3 or 5 categories as the national-level social norm is 12 
increased. Interestingly, the effect of the highest norm (T3) seems to be consistently weaker 13 
than the effect of the moderate norm (T2), relative to the lowest norm (T1) – although T3 14 
respondents are willing to pay more than T1 respondents, their WTP increase is not as high as 15 
that of T2 respondents. For city-level norm information, thus comparing T4 with T6, the only 16 
statistically significant effect is observed for relatively lower WTP for sorting into 2 categories. 17 
When both reference groups are used (national and city-level information; T5 relative to T7), 18 
we observe the statistically significant increase in WTP for sorting into 5 categories.  19 
Our first conclusion is thus that we find evidence that the absolute magnitude of the 20 
descriptive social norm is important for WTP for recycling. We observe positive statistically 21 
significant effects of higher social norm levels, although they are not necessarily monotone, 22 
with the highest absolute social norm levels being less effective in increasing WTP than more 23 
moderate social norm levels.7 In addition, we note very considerable preference heterogeneity 24 
for recycling in our data set – the standard deviation parameters for every level of the sort 25 
attribute are higher than the respective mean effects. We return to analysis of this 26 
heterogeneity when analysing hypothesis H4. 27 
                                                     
7 Note that in the case of comparisons of T4 with T6 and T5 with T7 by design of the experiment we are only able 
to observe the effects of the lowest and the highest levels, without the effects of middle levels. The middle levels 
were not included because of the lack of appropriate city statistics we could have uses without lying to 
respondents. 
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Table 2. The results of the MXL models in WTP-space (EUR) representing consumers’ general preferences for the number of in-home sorting categories 
and the frequency of collection in future waste collection contracts – the effects of increasing size of the communicated norm 
 Baseline – T1 
(Poland: 10%) Interactions 
Baseline – T4 
(Cities: 15/11/6%) Interactions 




 Mean St. Dev. T2 
(Poland: 44%) 
T3 
(Poland: 69%) Mean St. Dev. 
T6 
(Cities: 72/65/58%) 




Sort in 2 categories  





















Sort in 3 categories  





















Sort in 5 categories  





















Model diagnostics           
LL at convergence -6,069.40    -3,878.43   -3,997.89   
LL at constant(s) only -10,630.61    -6,938.19   -6,914.97   
McFadden's pseudo-R² 0.4291    0.4410   0.4219   
Ben-Akiva-Lerman's pseudo-R² 0.5195    0.5176   0.5219   
AIC/n 1.4578    1.4644   1.4600   
BIC/n 1.5096    1.5355   1.5291   
n (observations) 8,412    5,376   5,556   
r (respondents) 701    448   463   
k (parameters) 62    58   58   
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. Parameter estimates represent WTP expressed in EUR per month per household. Standard errors 
provided in parentheses. All parameters were assumed to be normally distributed with the exception of the cost, which was assumed log-normally distributed (estimated coefficients 
of the underlying normal distribution provided). The parameters of alternative specific constant, collection frequency and monthly cost per household were not treatment-specific. 
The model controls for scale (variance of the error term of utility function) differences between treatments. The frequency, cost and scale parameters were skipped for brevity – full 
results are available in the online supplement to this paper.   
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H2: Geographic proximity 1 
We hypothesised that information on the behaviour of a given percentage of others in the 2 
respondent’s own city would have a stronger effect than information about the same 3 
percentage behaviours across the entire Polish nation. A precise test of this hypothesis is 4 
beyond the reach of this study, as we could not set the same % levels for the city population in 5 
T4, T5, T6, T7 and in T1, T2 and T3 without misleading respondents. However, one would 6 
expect that a comparison of the size of effect between T1 and T3, relative to respectively T4 7 
and T6, would be revealing, as the lower and upper levels for the behaviour of “others” is rather 8 
similar. Table 3 presents these results.  9 
We found that in the case of low absolute descriptive norms (T1 vs. T4), moving from a nation-10 
level norm to a city-level norm did not result in significant changes of WTP. In the case of higher 11 
descriptive norms, moving from national (T3) to city-level norms (T6) resulted in statistically 12 
significant lower WTP for recycling. Apparently, the effect of communicating social norms that 13 
relate to more local reference group has a more nuanced effect than expected, with no 14 
significant differences in the case of low levels of social norms, and high levels of social norms 15 
leading to larger WTP decreases in the case of using city rather than the country as a reference.  16 
24 
Table 3. The results of the MXL models in WTP-space (EUR) representing consumers’ general preferences for the number of in-home sorting categories 
and the frequency of collection in future waste collection contracts – the effects of using a country vs. local norm 
 Baseline – T1 
(Poland: 10%) 
Interactions Baseline – T3 
(Poland: 69%) 
Interactions 
 Mean St. Dev. T4 
(Cities: 15/11/6%) Mean St. Dev. 
T6 
(Cities: 72/65/58%) 
Sort in 2 categories  













Sort in 3 categories  













Sort in 5 categories  













Model diagnostics       
LL at convergence -4,045.78   -3,909.09   
LL at constant(s) only -7,145.69   -6,890.32   
McFadden's pseudo-R² 0.4338   0.4327   
Ben-Akiva-Lerman's pseudo-R² 0.5190   0.5163   
AIC/n 1.4677   1.4726   
BIC/n 1.5365   1.5435   
n (observations) 5,592   5,388   
r (respondents) 466   449   
k (parameters) 58   58   
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. Parameter estimates represent WTP expressed in EUR per month per household. Standard errors 
provided in parentheses. All parameters were assumed to be normally distributed with the exception of the cost, which was assumed log-normally distributed (estimated coefficients 
of the underlying normal distribution provided). The parameters of alternative specific constant, collection frequency and monthly cost per household were not treatment-specific. 
The model controls for scale (variance of the error term of utility function) differences between treatments. The frequency, cost and scale parameters were skipped for brevity – full 
results are available in the online supplement to this paper. 
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H3: Relative versus absolute norm 1 
In this instance, we compare WTP values in T5 with those in T1 and T4; and WTP values in T7 2 
with those in T3 and T6. From Table 4, we can see that providing information on both the 3 
nation and city-level norms is more effective than using only one of these values. In the case 4 
of lower level norms, using national norms (T1) rather than both (T5) leads to statistically 5 
significant decreases of WTP for all levels of sorting. In the case of higher levels of 6 
communicated norms, using national norms only (T3) results in significantly lower WTP for all 7 
sorting levels than using both norms (T7), while using only city-level norms (T6) leads to lower 8 
decreases in WTP that are only significant for sorting into 2 categories. Overall, we find 9 
evidence in support of our hypothesis.  The social norm nudge has a greater positive impact 10 
on WTP when information on relative performance is provided alongside absolute 11 
performance information, and this result applies to social norm information at both city and 12 
national levels.8 13 
                                                     
8  Admittedly, it is likely that what matters is not only the provision of relative information but also the 
characteristics of the information itself. Note that the recycling levels in cities could have been above or below 
the country-level of recycling, potentially leading to different effects. We tried to analyse this using city-specific 
models, however, with much fewer observations the qualitative results were not stable across different modelling 
approaches and hence unreliable. For this reason, we only present the aggregated results here.  
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Table 4. The results of the MXL models in WTP-space (EUR) representing consumers’ general preferences for the number of in-home sorting categories 
and the frequency of collection in future waste collection contracts – the effects of using an absolute vs. relative norm 
 





















Sort in 2 categories  

















Sort in 3 categories  

















Sort in 5 categories  

















Model diagnostics         
LL at convergence -6,036.27    -5,956.29    
LL at constant(s) only -10,558.15    -10,400.05    
McFadden's pseudo-R² 0.4283    0.4273    
Ben-Akiva-Lerman's pseudo-R² 0.5184    0.5177    
AIC/n 1.4688    1.4622    
BIC/n 1.5212    1.5150    
n (observations) 8,304    8,232    
r (respondents) 692    686    
k (parameters) 62    62    
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. Parameter estimates represent WTP expressed in EUR per month per household. Standard errors 
provided in parentheses. All parameters were assumed to be normally distributed with the exception of the cost, which was assumed log-normally distributed (estimated coefficients 
of the underlying normal distribution provided). The parameters of alternative specific constant, collection frequency and monthly cost per household were not treatment-specific. 
The model controls for scale (variance of the error term of utility function) differences between treatments. The frequency, cost and scale parameters were skipped for brevity – full 
results are available in the online supplement to this paper.   
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H4: Impacts of past behaviour 
We now look at the preferences of sub-groups of respondents, defined using their current sorting 
behaviour; and how this current behaviour influences the effects of providing social norm 
information. The results are presented in Table 5.  
The first thing to notice is that people have a strong preference for maintaining current behaviours: 
respondents who currently sort in 2 categories prefer this kind of sorting the most, whilst those 
who currently sort in 3 categories are willing to pay the most for sorting into 3 categories. 
Respondents who currently sort into 5 categories find this kind of sorting much more appealing 
than any other respondents. As theory predicts, respondents’ current sorting behaviour largely 
reflects their preferences as stated.9 
Focusing on the provision of country-level social norm information (T1, T2 and T3) relative to no 
social norm information (T8), the most important result that we find is that whether respondents’ 
react to the communicated social norm strongly depends on their current level of recycling. 
Starting with respondents who do not currently sort, we find that higher levels of communicated 
social norm information result in higher WTP for all levels of sorting, except for the highest social 
norm level (T3) which does not significantly increase WTP for sorting into 5 categories. In stark 
contrast, for respondents who currently sort into 2 categories, the highest social norm level results 
in significantly reduced WTP for all levels of sorting. At the same time, the lower social norm levels 
significantly increase these respondents’ WTP for sorting into 5 categories. Providing social norm 
information for respondents who currently sort into 3 categories makes them WTP even more for 
this degree of sorting, with preferences for sorting into other number of categories largely 
unaffected. And finally, providing respondents who currently do the most sorting with social norm 
information generally decreases their WTP for almost all levels of sorting. Overall, while 
respondents who do not currently sort or sort only a little respond to the provided social norm 
information by increasing their WTP for higher levels of sorting, respondents who sort a lot react 
in a negative way, reducing their WTP for sorting into more categories. In addition, we find that 
                                                     
9 In choice experiments, in which the status quo alternative is associated with particular levels of all attributes (rather 
than being, e.g., an opt-out alternative), respondents’ preference for their status quo attribute levels get picked up 
by the parameter of the alternative specific constant associated with the status quo alternative. In our case, the 
alternative specific constant is free of this effect.  
28 
the highest social norm levels are not necessarily the most effective at changing stated 
preferences, in fact (by implication) discouraging some respondents from sorting.  
  
29 
Table 5. The results of the MXL models in WTP-space (EUR) representing consumers’ general 
preferences for the number of in-home sorting categories and the frequency of collection in future 
waste collection contracts – the effects of current/past behaviours 
  Baseline – T8 
(Control group) Interactions 

















Sort in 2 categories  











Sort in 3 categories  











Sort in 5 categories  


























Sort in 2 categories  











Sort in 3 categories  











Sort in 5 categories  


























Sort in 2 categories  











Sort in 3 categories  











Sort in 5 categories  


























Sort in 2 categories  











Sort in 3 categories  











Sort in 5 categories  











Model diagnostics      
LL at convergence -7832.78     
LL at constant(s) only -14186.69     
McFadden's pseudo-R² 0.4479     
Ben-Akiva-Lerman's pseudo-R² 0.5359     
AIC/n 1.4373     
BIC/n 1.6261     
n (observations) 11304     
r (respondents) 942     
k (parameters) 291     
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. Parameter estimates represent WTP 
expressed in EUR per month per household. Standard errors provided in parentheses. All parameters were assumed to 
be normally distributed with the exception of the cost, which was assumed log-normally distributed (estimated coefficients 
of the underlying normal distribution provided). The parameters of collection frequency and monthly cost per household 
were not treatment-specific. The model controls for scale (variance of the error term of utility function) differences 
between treatments. The frequency, cost and scale parameters were skipped for brevity – full results are available in the 
online supplement to this paper.   
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6. Discussion and Conclusions 1 
The role of social norms as part of environmental policy has become of increasing interest in 2 
the economics literature. This paper uses the choice experiment method to collect individual-3 
level data for people living in three Polish cities to test whether the way in which norm 4 
information is presented matters in terms of its effects on WTP for increased levels of recycling 5 
at the household level. Four testable hypotheses were developed from the literature, focussing 6 
on (i) the absolute size of the norm (ii) its geographic proximity (iii) whether relative 7 
performance information is presented and (iv) the interaction of the nudge with past 8 
behaviour. The research design randomly allocated respondents into one of eight treatments 9 
which capture this variation in social norm information.  10 
The interesting result that emerges is that while respondents generally respond to social norm 11 
information by increasing their WTP for more recycling, the effect is not necessarily monotone, 12 
whilst with the highest descriptive social norm levels are less effective than moderate social 13 
norm levels. Given that treatments were randomly assigned to respondents, we interpret 14 
these social norm effects as being causal. As discussed below, variation in personal-level 15 
existing behaviours helps co-determine response to social norm information; it may well be 16 
that as the absolute level of the norm rises, there are an increasing number of people for whom 17 
the norm greatly exceeds their current behaviours, which may explain why very high absolute 18 
levels of the norm are less effective (they seem “out of reach”). But we would also point to the 19 
high degree of heterogeneity in how people respond to each absolute size of norm as shown 20 
in Table 2. 21 
With respect to the geographical proximity, our hypothesis that using a more local reference 22 
group of “relevant others” for the pro-environmental behaviour would lead to larger effects in 23 
terms of changes to WTP was not found universally valid. While low levels of social norms did 24 
not lead to significant preference changes, we found that if high levels of social norms were 25 
used together with city rather than a country as a reference, the resulting WTP was lower. This 26 
effect should be considered jointly with our finding of lower effectiveness of high level of 27 
norms discussed in the previous paragraph. It is possible that whatever mechanism is leading 28 
respondents who are faced with high social norm levels to decrease their WTP for sorting, it is 29 
actually more pronounced if a local reference group of “relevant others” is used, compared to 30 
a national level reference group.  31 
31 
Regarding using relative versus absolute norms, we find that the nudge effect is stronger when 1 
more information on relative performance is provided. In our experiment, using combined 2 
country and city references rather than only one of these leads to higher WTP for some levels 3 
of sorting. This evidence supports our hypothesis H3 that providing relative performance 4 
information (in our case, the level of recycling in your city compared to recycling in Poland as 5 
a whole) should increase the impact of the nudge. It thus appears that people not only compare 6 
their own behaviour with the descriptive norm provided, but that they also place importance 7 
on the distance between this descriptive norm and some other measure of behaviour by a 8 
wider group.  9 
Finally, we find that whether and how strongly respondents’ react to the communicated social 10 
norm information depends on their current engagement level with household recycling. While 11 
respondents who do not currently sort or sort only a little respond to the provided social norm 12 
information by increasing their WTP for higher levels of sorting, respondents who currently 13 
recycle a lot react in a negative way to the nudge, reducing their WTP for sorting into a higher 14 
number of categories. In addition, we find that the highest social norm levels are not 15 
necessarily the most effective in increasing recycling behaviour, in fact discouraging some 16 
respondents from sorting. This suggests that if responses to a nudge depend on an easy-to-17 
observe characteristic of households or individuals, then there is a case for targeting the 18 
provision of social norm information to identified sub-sets of households. But we realise that 19 
those aspects of current behaviour which most influence the effects of a nudge may be costly 20 
to observe. 21 
An important point to note in thinking about these results is that the outcome variable we 22 
focus on – WTP for different levels of household recycling as required by a waste management 23 
contract – is rather more complex than the simpler outcome measures which others have 24 
studied, such as electricity use, water consumption or hotel towel re-use. However, the choice 25 
experiment method allowed us to explore the extent to which a given nudge had consistent 26 
effects across multiple attributes and levels associated with an environmental activity at the 27 
level of an individual. We would also highlight that the choices people made in our experiment 28 
were for waste management contracts which combine prices with environmental performance 29 
levels (waste sorting). WTP effects come about through impacts on both the dis-utility of higher 30 
prices and the positive or negative utility of higher levels of sorting and collection frequency.  31 
32 
Acknowledging limitations of our study, it should also be born in mind that, due to a desire to 1 
avoid misleading or lying to respondents, somewhat different definitions of “recycling” were 2 
employed in developing the descriptive norms. In T1-T3 (national level) this varied from “% of 3 
waste sorted” to “households who sort waste regularly” to “% who declared they sort waste”. 4 
Even though the information contained in each message relates to the same underlying pro-5 
environmental behaviour (levels of household recycling) which the nudge is targeting, these 6 
definitions are not quite the same. This difference could have led to lower than expected 7 
sensitivity to national level norms. However, the only alternative design would have been to 8 
mislead respondents. We also acknowledge that perceived social norms might be important: 9 
if I think that around 60% of Polish households recycle, and then I am told by an interviewer 10 
that the actual figure is 40%, then the effects on my behaviour and/or WTP for more recycling 11 
could be different than if I imagined, ex ante, that only 20% of households in Poland recycle. 12 
We do not observe such variation in perceived levels of collective behaviour across 13 
respondents in our sample, and so cannot control for it. 14 
It is also important to point out that in the context of our stated preference experiments, the 15 
extent to which an individual’s behaviour differs from a social norm is not subject to a public 16 
sanction, since choice cards were completed in confidence. Such public sanctions (e.g., 17 
reputation effects; shame) have been argued to be important for the effectiveness of a social 18 
norm on behaviour, whether the norm is descriptive or injunctive. On the other hand, deviating 19 
from the social norm can be thought of as imposing a utility penalty on individuals as per the 20 
conceptual model of Czajkowski, Hanley and Nyborg (2015). This self-sanction is not equivalent 21 
to a public sanction, and does not depend on observability. It is also true that the ability of 22 
individuals to monitor the recycling behaviour of others is limited (you can watch me walk to 23 
the recycling bank with empty wine bottles, but you are unlikely to go through my recycling 24 
bin to see how full it is, or whether it is contaminated with non-recyclable material). If agents’ 25 
behaviour is only imperfectly observed, then the ability to sanction behaviour which violates a 26 
social norm is compromised. However, this is only one mechanism through which a social norm 27 
can change behaviour. 28 
The stated choice method is presented here as a useful tool to predict the consequences of 29 
potential behavioural policies before they are introduced (Hanley and Czajkowski, 2017). This 30 
could potentially allow policy makers to avoid costly mistakes or failures to deliver policy 31 
33 
targets from introducing the wrong nudge.  Of course, lab experiments can also be used to pre-1 
test new policy instruments, but this typically comes at the cost of a much less diverse and 2 
representative sample of respondents than is the case with stated choice models. Stated 3 
choice approaches offer a low cost and highly adaptable tool for pre-testing behavioural 4 
nudges as a component of environmental policy before such nudges are implemented in 5 
practice. 6 
In conclusion, although social norm campaigns are very tempting as a solution to 7 
environmental problems due to their low cost and appeal to liberal paternalism, their effects 8 
often cannot be generalised and thus are hard to predict for specific policy cases and specific 9 
targeted populations. Our results show that the effects of a descriptive norm-based nudge on 10 
willingness to pay for enhanced recycling depend on the nature of the nudge (absolute size, 11 
geographic proximity, inclusion of relative performance information) as well as on the 12 
observable existing behaviours of those exposed to the nudge. We therefore recommend 13 
careful pretesting norm-based nudges before introducing them as a “routine” part of the policy 14 
tool-kit. As shown here, stated choice models are a useful way of carrying out such pre-tests.  15 
34 
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